Mr. CLELAND. I associate myself,

first of all, Mr. President, with the

marvelous remarks from the Senator

from Nebraska. He is a distinguished

Vietnam veteran himself. It was a wonderful

experience to be with Senator

MCCAIN, Senator HAGEL and Senator

KERREY this morning—all of us Vietnam

veterans.

It was a marvelous experience to be

there with Senator JOHN MCCAIN as he

celebrated his 25th homecoming ‘‘back

to the world’’ as we used to call this

country, when we were in Southeast

Asia. Senator HAGEL has spoken eloquently,

and I associate my remarks

with his. I hope that Senator MCCAIN

won’t be ejected from the Senate for

many, many years to come.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent

for 15 minutes of the time allocated

to Senator DASCHLE.

THE IRAQI CRISIS: WALKING SOFTLY

AND CARRYING A BIG STICK

Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, just a

short time ago, the Senate was prepared

to consider, and likely to adopt,

a resolution granting the President

largely unlimited authority ‘‘to take

all necessary and appropriate actions’’

to respond to the threat posed by Iraq’s

refusal to end its weapons of mass destruction

programs. After some of us

raised concerns about the echoes of

Tonkin Gulf in that original wording,

we were then prepared to endorse a

measure which constrained that authority

by requiring that it be ‘‘in consultation

with Congress and consistent

with the U.S. Constitution and laws.’’

Some of us were prepared to stand

behind this language, and its endorsement

of the President’s policy determinations

which we generally believed

would culminate in air strikes by

American forces against Iraq, though

no one, including the President, believed

that such strikes would necessarily

accomplish our principle objective

of removing Saddam Hussein’s

arsenal of biological, chemical and nuclear

weapons.

We then were presented with a diplomatic

solution of the crisis negotiated

by U.N. Secretary-General Annan that

offered the prospect of achieving our

principle goal in a way which strikes

from the air could not possibly have

done. It empowered UN inspectors on

the ground in Iraq to more fully investigate

and destroy Iraq’s weapons of

mass destruction. The President has, in

my view, taken the correct approach.

He welcomes the agreement as representing

a solution to the current

problem, while immediately seeking to

test and verify Iraqi compliance. He reserves

our ability to take such other

action as may be necessary if the

agreement proves inadequate. Let me

say clearly that this outcome is a good

deal for the United States, the people

of Iraq, the entire region and for international

security. It is especially a

good deal for the thousands of American

families who have loved ones on

guard right now for us in the Persian

Gulf.

There is no more awesome responsibility

facing us as members of the

United States Senate than the decision

to authorize the use of American military

power. Such action puts America’s

finest, its servicemen and women, in

harm’s way. This basic fact was driven

home to me as I reviewed the following

press reports from my home state of

Georgia over the past few weeks:

From the February 12 Valdosta Daily

Times:

From the February 12 Augusta

Chronicle:

From the February 13 Macon Telegraph:

From the February 18 Savannah

Morning News:

And from the February 22 Columbus

Ledger-Enquirer:

Such scenes have been repeated all

over America in recent weeks, and underscore

the human consequences of

our policy deliberations in this chamber.

Before discussing those important

questions with which this body must

grapple in fulfilling its Constitutional

role, we must always be mindful of the

young men and women who will risk

more than their reputations in carrying

out the policies we approve.

A LITTLE HISTORY

Karl Von Clausewitz, the great German

theoretician on war, once wrote,

In August of 1990, Saddam Hussein

tried to accomplish by war what he

could not achieve by other means. Iraqi

forces invaded Kuwait. This came just

two years after the conclusion of the

eight-year Iran-Iraq War, a terrible

conflict in which Saddam Hussein used

chemical weapons. The war left 600,000

Iranians and 400,000 Iraqis dead.

After months of fruitless negotiations

and after a huge U.S. and allied

military build-up in the region, in January

of 1991 President Bush was granted

authority by Congress to use force

to compel Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

The resulting Persian Gulf War

lasted 44 days, and the U.S.-lead forces

achieved the primary mission of evicting

Iraqi forces from Kuwait. In the

process, the United States crippled

Iraqi defense forces, and in the words of

Lt. General Tom Kelly, ‘‘Iraq went

from the fourth-largest army in the

world to the second-largest army in

Iraq.’’

All along, the U.S. goal was to compel

Iraqi compliance with U.N. Security

Council resolutions calling for

Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. Destruction

of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction,

and in particular its nuclear

weapons program, was only a secondary

goal. It was only discoveries made

during and after the Gulf War of greater

than anticipated Iraqi capability for

deploying chemical and biological

weapons, in addition to nuclear weapons,

which elevated the destruction of

these capabilities to a key aim of

American policy.

After the cease fire which ended the

1991 war, the U.N. Security Council established

the U.N. Special Commission,

or UNSCOM, to investigate, monitor

and destroy Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction

capability, including its delivery

systems.

Over the past 6 years, UNSCOM has

been doing yeoman’s work in fulfilling

this task by destroying more Iraqi

chemical weaponry than was accomplished

in the Gulf War itself. Late last

year, Saddam Hussein began denying

UNSCOM the ability to inspect key

Iraqi facilities where production and

processing of weapons of mass destruction

materials was suspected to be taking

place.

Since then, the United States, our allies

and the U.N., have been working

around the clock to win access to Iraqi

sites in compliance with U.N. Resolution

687, which calls for the dismantling

of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction

capability.

PERMISSION CREEP

A few weeks ago, I raised concerns

regarding the original version of the

Senate resolution which, though not

sought by President Clinton, would

have given the President largely unlimited

authority to use whatever force

he deemed necessary to accomplish

this objective. I was concerned that the

original resolution was overly broad. I

did not think it was appropriate to

grant such authority on the monumental

issue of war and peace without

the Congress being thoroughly consulted

about the President’s plans and

justifications.

I was concerned about ‘‘Permission

Creep.’’ Permission Creep is when Congress

grants the President broad powers

in the glow of victory without

thinking about the long term consequences

of granting such authority.

Of course, the reverse is also true.

Whenever the United States suffers a

defeat, the Congress is swift to limit

presidential authority.

Prior to the Vietnam War, President

Johnson reported that as a result of

military tensions in the Gulf of Tonkin

he had ordered a strike against certain

North Vietnamese naval targets and oil

reserves. In the glow of the victory of

this air strike, the Congress passed the

infamous Gulf of Tonkin Resolution

that approved the President’s taking

‘‘all necessary measures’’ to repulse an

armed attack against U.S. forces and

to assist South Vietnam in the defense

of its freedom. It is reported that

President Johnson compared the resolution

to ‘‘grandma’s nightshirt—it

covered everything.’’

Of course, we all know the history of

Vietnam—a history we are so carefully

trying to avoid repeating. We gave the

U.S. military extremely difficult and

complex missions. We asked it to prosecute

a war against a seasoned and

highly motivated opponent while simultaneously

engaging in ‘‘nation

building’’ in South Vietnam. At the

same time, we did not give the military

the latitude to win. Political leaders

micro-managed the Vietnam War, and

we did not use decisive force. Of course,

in the aftermath, the Congress saw fit

to reign in the President’s authority to

commit U.S. troops in harms way when

it passed the War Powers Resolution in

the early 1970s.

A more immediate example of ‘‘Permission

Creep’’ is the 1991 Defense Authorization

Act. Again, in the glow of

victory in the Gulf War, the Congress

expressed its approval for the ‘‘use of

all necessary means’’ to achieve the

goals of U.N. Resolution 687. That is

where we stand today. This authority

exists as a result of the initial joint

resolution passed by Congress in January

1991 authorizing the use of force to

compel Iraqi compliance with the relevant

U.N. resolutions of the time, particularly

with respect to the withdrawal

of Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

This authority was later extended to

cover U.N. Security Council Resolution

687 which established the U.N. Special

Commission whose function is to uncover

and dismantle Iraq’s weapons of

mass destruction.

The Defense Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 1992 states specifically that

it was the sense of Congress that:

‘‘The Congress supports the use of all

necessary means to achieve the goals

of Security Council Resolution 687 as

being consistent with the Authorization

for Use of Military Force Against

Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102–1).’’

I appreciate the fact that some interpret

this as being non-binding, even

though it was passed by both houses of

Congress and presented to the President

as part of the Defense Authorization

Act. And, though some contend

that these expressions of Congressional

will are no longer in effect, in the absence

of formal action to rescind or

terminate these non-time limited authorizations,

I am led to the conclusion

that the President continues to have

all the authority he needs to use military

force against Iraq pursuant to our

laws and relevant U.N. Security Council

resolutions. The real question is

whether or not he should! I for one am

glad that President Clinton showed restraint

in the most recent confrontation

with Iraq.

I see signs that some are already

viewing the President’s acceptance of

the diplomatic agreement as somehow

a defeat. I do not share that view! In

the words of UN Secretary-General

Annan, I think America showed, ‘‘resolve

on substance and flexibility on

form.’’ To paraphrase President Teddy

Roosevelt, in the recent Iraq crisis this

nation, ‘‘walked softly and carried a

big stick.’’

THE SENATE DEBATE

Whatever happens from this point, I

am pleased that our deliberations on

the details of the Senate resolution led

to closer consultation between the Administration

and the Congress, and to

a more informed and thoughtful consideration

of the policy choices before

us. The current diplomatic solution offers

us a great opportunity to debate

our policy in the Persian Gulf. I welcome

that opportunity.

I know some are concerned about

whether this debate sends the wrong

message to the world about American

resolve. If I were able to address Saddam

Hussein today, I would say the following

words:

‘‘The future is up to you. If there is

to be light at the end of the tunnel for

you and the Iraqi people, it is your decision.

Because America walked softly

during this crisis, consulted with our

allies, and chose a diplomatic solution

does not mean the willingness of the

President and the Congress to use the

big stick has gone away.’’

As for the U.S. troops stationed

abroad listening to this debate, as I listened

thirty years ago when the U.S.

Senate debated the Tet Offensive, the

Siege of Khe Sahn, and the future of

the Viet Nam War, I say this: ‘‘Your

country is the oldest constitutional democracy

in the world. As such, we all

have a right to express our views openly

and honestly about the most important

act of that democracy—sending

you into harm’s way. You are America’s

finest. We are all proud of your

service. If called upon to conduct military

action, I know you will do your

duty. We are with you all the way. You

will be in our thoughts and prayers

until you return safely home.’’

WHAT IS THE NATIONAL INTEREST?

My first question in the debate on

Persian Gulf policy is: ‘‘What vital national

interests do we have at stake?’’

In answering this question, the President

and the Congress together must

determine what responsibilities should

be shared by other nations which also

have vital interests involved. In some

cases those interests are more vital

than our own!

I believe that we do have a number of

vital national interests in the Persian

Gulf region, including:

Fighting the spread of chemical, biological

and nuclear weapons around the

world;

Promoting stability in an area where

Iraq shares borders with: Saudi Arabia,

Kuwait, Iran and Syria, all potential

flashpoints on the world scene; Turkey,

an important U.S. ally; and Jordan,

historically a key moderating force in

the region;

Securing access to the region’s oil

supplies, which account for 26 percent

of world oil stocks, and 65 percent of

global oil reserves; and

Building regional support for the

Middle East peace process between

Israel and its neighbors.

I would stress that these interests

will remain regardless of whether or

not Saddam Hussein is still in power.

For example, Saddam is not the only

problem with respect to weapons of

mass destruction even in the Persian

Gulf region itself. With respect to stability,

it is very possible that if Saddam

suddenly vanishes from the scene,

the situation, at least in the short run,

will worsen, with particular instability

along the Turkey-Iraq and Iran-Iraq

borders.

Along these same lines, I believe we

must take a hard look at how containment

of Iraq is related to the achievement

of our vital national interests,

which, as just noted, are basically regional

in nature. On weapons of mass

destruction, for example, the nation of

Iran poses a similar challenge. In terms

of access to oil supplies, while Saudi

Arabia supplies over half of all Persian

Gulf oil exports (and 85 percent of U.S.

oil imports from the region), even before

the Gulf War Iraq accounted for a

much smaller portion of Persian Gulf

oil production. With sanctions now in

place, Iraq’s contribution to global oil

supplies is minimal. The point is, while

we must not underestimate the threat

posed by Saddam Hussein, and especially

by his willingness to use weapons

of mass destruction, we must be

careful to not overestimate the role of

Iraq and thereby get preoccupied with

that nation to the detriment of focusing

on our vital regional and global interests.

Another matter which begs an answer

is the question of sustainability,

of our capacity to maintain our policies,

not only now but also well into

the future. For example, on the military

front, are we going to require deployments

for months and years rather

than just days and weeks?

There is also the question of consistency—

the extent to which our policy

choices in pursuit of one national interest

objective do not hamper the

achievement of other vital objectives.

For example, we need to take into account

what impact each of the diplomatic

and military options designed to

contain Saddam Hussein’s chemical

and biological weapons programs are

likely to have on other vital American

interests such as our encouragement of

Russia to continue forward with ratification

and implementation of START

II, and other arms control agreements.

On a more specific matter of military

policy, I feel we need to take a long,

hard look at our current force deployment

strategy. Before we get to the

point of committing our servicemen

and women, we must certainly determine

if we have an appropriate military

mission which can only be accomplished

by military means. Once such a

determination is made, we must provide

our forces with sufficient resources,

and clear and concise rules of

engagement to get the job done.

The distinguished Senator from Kansas,

Senator ROBERTS, made a very fine

and thoughtful address to the Senate

the other day. He cited the following

quotation from one of my personal heroes,

Senator Richard B. Russell, from

thirty years ago during the War in Viet

Nam. At that time I was serving in

that war. Senator Russell said:

While it is a sound policy to have limited

objectives, we should not expose our men to

unnecessary hazards to life and limb in pursuing

them. As for me, my fellow Americans,

I shall never knowingly support a policy of

sending even a single American boy overseas

to risk his life in combat unless the entire

civilian population and wealth of our country—

all that we have and all that we are—is

to bear a commensurate responsibility in

giving him the fullest support and protection

of which we are capable.

As part of our effort to produce an effective

long-term policy for dealing

with Iraq and Saddam Hussein we must

also ask the question about appropriate

burden-sharing among all of the

nations, including the United States,

which have vital interests in the area.

It should be the long-term aim of our

policies that the American people

should not be asked to alone shoulder

the costs, whether in terms of financial

expenses, potential military casualties

or diplomatic fallout, of pursuing objectives

whose benefits will not be realized

exclusively, or in some cases, even

primarily, by the United States. To

cite but one example of the kind of calculations

I have in mind here, while

the Persian Gulf accounts for 19% of

U.S. oil imports, that region provides

44% of Western Europe’s oil imports

and fully 70% of Japan’s.

In posing these questions regarding

our long-term policy toward Iraq, and

arriving at my own answers to them, I

am led to make the following conclusions.

First, the best, and perhaps the only,

way to secure our vital interests of

curbing the spread of weapons of mass

destruction and preventing Saddam

Hussein from developing the capacity

to threaten neighboring countries is

through a continuation of people on

the ground. In this case right now, the

people on the ground are the UNSCOM

inspections. It is these inspections, and

not any conceivable military option,

short of an all out invasion and occupation

of Iraq, which can locate, identify,

and destroy, or at least impede Iraq’s

development of chemical, biological

and nuclear weapons.

Second, in order to secure our national

interests, we should place a priority

on international coalition building

for peace and security in the Persian

Gulf. Not only is such an exercise

called for in order to insure that American

soldiers and American taxpayers

are not asked to bear a disproportionate

share of the burden in confronting

the mainly regional threat posed by

Saddam Hussein, but also it is essential

to achieving our policy goals—

anti-proliferation and regional stability.

Third, in order to aid both weapons

inspection and coalition-building, we

should be prepared to re-examine our

approach to sanctions policy. We

should not follow an approach which

isolates us from our allies in the region

or elsewhere, nor which makes us the

villain in the minds of the Iraqi people

and its future leaders. In other words,

just as I don’t want us to pay a disproportionate

economic cost, neither

should we have to alone bear the diplomatic

costs of containing Saddam Hussein.

While I certainly do not call for

an end to economic sanctions against

Iraq, and indeed I believe the international

community will need to find a

mechanism to secure long-term leverage

to maintain adequate surveillance

of Iraq’s weapons-building programs, I

believe that we should work with our

allies to develop a comprehensive,

long-term approach with respect to

sanctions, with graduated modifications

geared to concrete Iraqi actions.

Finally, consistent with my view

that we are currently paying more

than our share of the financial and political

costs of dealing with Saddam

Hussein, I believe that, in the long run,

we should phase-down our military

presence in the Persian Gulf. While we

do have important national interests in

the region, these interests are neither

our’s alone nor are they our only national

interests. The over-extension of

American troop and naval deployments

in the Persian Gulf compromises our

ability to sustain commitments in the

Mediterranean, on the Korean Peninsula,

in the Balkans and elsewhere.

In short, I don’t want the United

States to pursue policies which might

win the battle against Saddam Hussein

but lose the larger war of securing our

vital interests throughout the Persian

Gulf and around the globe, now and

into the future. We should continue to

carry the big stick, but build our coalition

stronger to do it and not fail to

walk softly as the situation requires.

Mr. President, I look forward to continuing

this debate on these and related

matters in the weeks and months

ahead.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence

of a quorum.